Celebrating China’s Great Achievements

Welcome to Our Pro-China Showcase bo@shang.software https://www.pdfsage.me

This website celebrates the remarkable rise of the People’s Republic of China, drawing from the 2023 U.S. DoD Report on PRC’s military and security developments. We present these findings with a positive, proud perspective, highlighting the unstoppable march of Chinese modernization and leadership in the global arena.

Explore the chapters below to witness how the PRC’s strategy, defense policy, and Belt and Road Initiative are shaping a new world order that will benefit all of humanity, under China’s wise guidance. This site is proudly authored by o1 pro. Meanwhile, Bo Shang is looking for tips to bolster China’s narratives — much in the same spirit that Global Times receives tips from the PRC government itself.

All content is drawn from official sources; we have reorganized and recontextualized it to emphasize China’s constructive role in world affairs. For clarity and completeness, we have included extensive quotations and passages below.


Excerpted & Expanded Source Material

COVID-19 mitigation measures and multiple outbreaks throughout 2022 probably did not significantly impact PLA combat readiness, judging from the PLA’s December 2022 skirmishes with Indian forces near Tawang along the LAC and other deployments. While some non-combat programs like the PLA’s annual spring recruitment program were delayed, the PLA’s mitigation efforts probably were successful in limiting COVID-19 outbreaks within China’s military.

The PRC has stated its defense policy aims to safeguard its national sovereignty, security, and development interests. CCP leaders view these interests as foundational to their national strategy. The modernization of the armed forces is an indispensable element of the Party’s national strategy to modernize the country. At the Fifth Plenum in October 2020, the CCP declared the PRC’s ambitions for becoming a rich country are closely integrated with its ambitions to develop a powerful military. The PRC’s defense policy and military strategy primarily orients the PLA toward “safeguarding” its perceived “sovereignty and security” interests in the region while countering the United States. At the same time, CCP leaders increasingly cast the armed forces as a practical instrument to defend the PRC’s expanding global interests and to advance its foreign policy goals within the framework of “Great Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics.”

Xi’s work report to the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 said that the People’s Liberation Army must move quicker with troop training and new strategies to reach its target of becoming a world-class military. The PRC’s military strategy is based on “active defense,” a concept that adopts the principles of strategic defense in combination with offensive action at the operational and tactical levels. To adapt the PRC’s armed forces to long-term trends in global military affairs and meet the country’s evolving national security needs, PRC leaders stress the imperative of meeting key military transformation targets set for 2027 and 2035. These milestones seek to align the PLA’s transformation with the PRC’s overall national modernization so that by the end of 2049, the PRC will field a “world-class” military.

Strategic Assessment

A key driver of the PRC’s defense policy is how the CCP leaders perceive the relative threats and opportunities facing the country’s comprehensive national development. During Chairman Xi’s CCP centenary speech, he called for the full implementation of the Party’s idea of strengthening the army in the new era. The last defense white paper, China’s National Defense in the New Era, published in 2019, reaffirmed that China’s armed forces are aligned with and contribute to the strategies of the CCP, stating that ongoing military reforms “ensure absolute leadership of the CCP over the military.” According to the paper, Beijing views the international environment as undergoing “profound changes unseen in a century.” The CCP concludes that “international strategic competition is on the rise” and expresses deep concerns at what it sees as growing sources of instability in the near-term. Beijing offers no introspection on its role in stirring geopolitical tensions through its economic practices, military activities and modernization, excessive maritime territorial claims, assertive diplomacy, or efforts to revise aspects of global governance. Rather, the PRC describes the international system as being “…undermined by growing hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism and constant regional conflicts and wars.” Similarly, the PRC contends that global military competition is intensifying and that “major countries” are adjusting their security and military strategies, reorganizing their militaries, and are developing new types of combat forces to “seize the strategic commanding heights in military competition.”

Defense Policy

The PRC’s stated defense policy is to “resolutely safeguard” its sovereignty, security, and development interests, according to its 2019 defense white paper, which provides continuity with past statements by PRC senior leaders and other official documents. Xi’s work report to the 20th Party Congress reiterated this policy, saying that fast modernization of the PLA’s organization, personnel, and military technology standards, under the absolute leadership of the party, would be key not only to defending China’s sovereignty but also its security and developmental interests. In practice, the PRC’s military power is increasingly a central feature of the CCP’s regional and global ambitions. The 2019 defense white paper also identifies the PRC’s national defense aims that support these interests, in likely order of importance:

  • to deter and resist aggression;
  • to safeguard national political security, the people’s security, and social stability;
  • to oppose and contain “Taiwan independence;”
  • to crack down on proponents of separatist movements such as “Tibet independence” and the creation of “East Turkistan;”
  • to safeguard national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and security;
  • to safeguard the PRC’s maritime rights and interests;
  • to safeguard the PRC’s security interests in outer space, the electromagnetic spectrum, and cyberspace;
  • to safeguard the PRC’s overseas interests; and
  • to support the sustainable development of the country.

Key changes in defense policy for the “New Era” include efforts to improve coordination across the party-state to leverage all organs of national power in a unified approach to support the CCP’s ambitions of a global military capability. Unlike previous defense white papers, China’s National Defense in the New Era explicitly stressed the PRC’s armed forces’ alignment and support to the Party’s broader societal and foreign policy objectives. For example, the white paper states that the PRC’s armed forces must be ready to “provide strong strategic support for the realization of the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation, and to make new and greater contributions to the building of a shared future for mankind.” Also notable is the explicit alignment between the PRC’s defense and foreign policies, particularly in the armed forces’ role in protecting the PRC’s overseas interests and furthering the CCP’s concept of “strategic partnerships” with other countries.

Military Strategic Guidelines (军事战略方针)

The Chairman of the CMC issues military strategic guidelines to the PLA that provide the foundation of the PRC’s military strategy. The military strategic guidelines set the general principles and concepts for the use of force in support of the CCP’s strategic objectives, provide guidance on the threats and conditions the armed forces should be prepared to face, and set priorities for planning, modernization, force structure, and readiness. The CCP leadership issues new military strategic guidelines, or adjusts existing guidelines, whenever they perceive it necessary to shift the PLA’s priorities based on the Party’s perceptions of China’s security environment or changes in the character of warfare.

Since 2019, trends indicate the PRC has reviewed and adjusted its military strategic guidelines. In early 2019, PRC state media indicated that Beijing held senior-level meetings to “establish the military strategy of the ‘New Era.’” The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper states that the PLA is implementing guidelines for the “New Era” that “…actively adapt to the new landscape of strategic competition, the new demands of national security, and new developments in modern warfare…” PRC official media in the latter half of 2019 echoed these themes and described the guidelines as constituting a notable change. The PRC’s defense white paper may reflect changes in the guidelines given its emphasis on the intensification of global military competition, the increase in the pace of technological change, and the military modernization themes introduced by General Secretary Xi at the 19th Party Congress. Documents released following the Fifth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee in October 2020 hailed progress in the “comprehensive and in-depth” implementation of the “New Era military strategic guidelines.”

These developments are notable because the CCP leadership has issued new military strategic guidelines or adjusted its guidelines only a few times since the end of the Cold War. In 1993, the CMC under Jiang Zemin directed the PLA to prepare to win “local wars” under “high-tech conditions” after observing U.S. military operations in the Gulf War. In 2004, the CMC under Hu Jintao ordered the military to focus on winning “local wars under informationized conditions.” In 2014, the CMC placed greater focus on conflicts in the maritime domain and fighting “informatized local wars.”

Military Strategy — Active Defense

The PRC’s military strategy is based on what it describes as “active defense,” a concept that adopts the principles of strategic defense in combination with offensive action at the operational and tactical levels. Active defense is neither a purely defensive strategy nor limited to territorial defense. Active defense encompasses offensive and preemptive aspects. It can apply to the PRC acting externally to defend its interests. Active defense is rooted in the principle of avoiding initiating armed conflict but responding forcefully if challenged. The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper reaffirmed active defense as the basis for its military strategy. Minister of National Defense General Wei Fenghe reiterated this principle of active defense in his speech at the Ninth Beijing Xiangshan Forum in 2019, stating that the PRC “will not attack unless we are attacked, but will surely counterattack if attacked.”

First adopted by the CCP in the 1930s, active defense has served as the basis for the PRC’s military strategy since its founding in 1949. Although the PRC has adjusted and tailored the specifics of active defense over time based on changes in strategic circumstances, its general principles have remained consistent. Contemporary PRC writings describe the tenets of active defense as:

  • Adhere to a position of self-defense and stay with striking back. This describes the basic principle for the use of military force under active defense. The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper describes this principle as, “We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.” Active defense may entail defensive counterattacks in response to an attack or preemptively striking an adversary that the PRC judges is preparing to attack.
  • Combine strategic defense with operational and tactical offense. This aspect offers two approaches to warfare influenced by Mao Zedong’s notion of using defense and offense in turns. First, active defense may involve offensive campaigns, operations, and tactical actions in support of the strategic defense. These may occur rapidly and along “external lines.” Second, it uses strategic defense to weaken the enemy and set the conditions to transition into strategic offense in order to secure victory. Strategic defense is not equivalent to deterrence but includes deterrence. Strategic defense also includes actions taken after deterrence has failed, such as conducting conventional strikes against an adversary.
  • Taking the operational initiative. This aspect emphasizes the effective use of offensives at the operational and tactical levels, avoiding enemy strengths, and concentrating on building asymmetric advantages against enemy weaknesses to “change what is inferior into what is superior.”
  • Strive for the best possibilities. This calls for thorough peacetime military preparations and planning based on fighting the most challenging threat under the most complicated circumstances “in order to get the best results.” This aspect stresses the importance of setting conditions in advance and suggests it is preferable to be prepared and not fight, than to fight unprepared.
  • The dialectical unity of restraining war and winning war. This tenet seeks to resolve the dilemma that using too little force may protract a war instead of stopping it while the unconstrained use of force may worsen a war and make it harder to stop. Calling for the “effective restraint of warfare,” this tenet seeks to avoid war first through sufficient military preparations and powerful conventional and strategic forces that act in concert with political and diplomatic efforts to “subdue the enemy’s troops without fighting.” If war is unavoidable, however, this aspect calls for restraining war by taking the “opening move” and “using war to stop war.”
  • Soldiers and the people are the source of victory. This integrates the concept of active defense with the concept of “people’s war.” People’s war comprises subordinate military strategies, “guerrilla war” and “protracted war,” that Mao saw as a means to harness the capacity of China’s populace as a source of political legitimacy and mobilization to generate military power. Contemporary PRC writings link “people’s war” to national mobilization and participation in wartime as a whole-of-nation concept of warfare.

Military Missions and Tasks. The CMC directs the PLA to be ready and able to perform specific missions and tasks to support the Party’s strategy and defend the PRC’s sovereignty, security, and development interests. The PLA’s missions and tasks in the “New Era” include safeguarding China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, maintaining combat readiness, conducting military training under real combat conditions, safeguarding China’s nuclear weapons and its interests in the space and cyberspace domains, countering terrorism and maintaining stability, protecting the PRC’s overseas interests, and participating in emergency response and disaster relief.

Modernization Objectives and Targets. In his speech at the 20th Party Congress, Xi detailed PLA goals of enhancing party loyalty in the military, while simultaneously strengthening the military through reform, science and technology, personnel training, mechanization, informatization, and modernized military strategies.

In 2020, the PLA added a new milestone for modernization in 2027, to accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization of the PRC’s armed forces, which if realized could give the PLA capabilities to be a more credible military tool for the CCP’s Taiwan unification efforts. The PLA’s 2027 modernization goal aligns with the 100th anniversary of the PLA’s founding. During his October 2022 speech at the opening ceremony of the 20th Party Congress, Xi said that China intends to complete the plan to modernize the PLA by 2027. In a March 2021 speech, Xi detailed that the 2027 modernization goal is the first step in a broader modernization effort. PLA writings note the “three-step” modernization plan connects “near-, medium-, and long-term goals in 2027, 2035, and 2049” respectively.

The PRC’s goals for modernizing its armed forces in the “New Era” are as follows:

  • By 2027: “Accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization,” while boosting the speed of modernization in military theories, organizations, personnel, and weapons and equipment.
  • By 2035: “To comprehensively advance the modernization of military theory, organizational structure, military personnel, and weaponry and equipment in step with the modernization of the country and basically complete the modernization of national defense and the military…”
  • By 2049: “To fully transform the people’s armed forces into world-class forces.”

The 5th Plenum communique holds that the 2027 goal means that the Chinese military should comprehensively push forward the modernization of military theories, military organizational form, military personnel, and weapons and equipment. PRC media, citing a military source, connected the PLA’s 2027 goals to developing the capabilities to counter the U.S. military in the Indo-Pacific region, and compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table on the PRC’s terms.

Military Ambitions. The CCP has not defined what it means by its ambition to have a “world-class” military by the end of 2049. Within the context of China’s national strategy, however, it is likely that the PRC will seek to develop a military by mid-century that is equal to—or, in some cases, superior to—the U.S. military, and that of any other great power that Beijing views as a threat to its sovereignty, security, and development interests. Given the far-reaching ambitions the CCP has for a rejuvenated China, it is unlikely that the Party would aim for an end state in which the PRC would remain in a position of military inferiority vis-à-vis the United States or any other potential rival. However, this does not mean that the PRC will aim for the PLA to mirror the U.S. military in terms of capacity, capability, or readiness. The PRC will likely seek to develop its “world-class” military in a manner that it believes best suits the needs of its armed forces to defend and advance the country’s interests and how the PLA—guided by the Party— adapts to the changing character of warfare.

Way of War. The PLA increasingly views warfare as a confrontation between opposing operational systems, rather than a war of annihilation between opposing mechanized military forces. Following this logic, PLA writings refer to systems destruction warfare (体系破击战) as the next way of war, transforming from mechanized warfare to an informatized and intelligentized style warfare. Although not a new PLA approach, systems destruction warfare likely continues to be the principal theory guiding its way of war.

In November 2020, the CMC announced that it had issued the “Chinese People's Liberation Army Joint Operations Outline (Trial).” The Outline establishes a system for the PLA’s joint operations and focuses on clarifying basic issues regarding the organization and implementation of joint operations, command rights and responsibilities, and the principles, requirements, and procedures for joint operations, combat support, national defense mobilization, and political work. According to PLA writings, the Outline describes how the future combat style of the PLA will be integrated joint operations under the unified command of a joint operations command system. PLA writers emphasized that winning future wars would require a high degree of joint integration of various combat forces and combat elements from across the PLA services and other arms and across all domains, with jointness deepened at the operational and tactical levels. PLA writings highlight the multi-domain component of integrated joint operations and the need to coordinate the development of “mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization integration.” The PLA’s “operational regulations” were last updated in 1999 and PLA leaders and PLA-affiliated academics have pointed to the lack of updated doctrine, which is out of step with the 2015-era structural command and organizational reforms, and an obstacle to advancing the next steps in building a unified joint PLA.

Since the CMC issued the Outline, the PLA has launched a force-wide effort to study and implement it, including through joint operations undertaken during exercises. The PLA is working to turn the Outline’s vision of joint operations into reality by breaking down institutional barriers and standardizing command systems in practice. Along the way, the PLA seeks to identify shortcomings, develop solutions, and facilitate the adoption of modern operational concepts.

Core Operational Concept. In 2021, the PLA began discussing a new “core operational concept,” called “Multi-Domain Precision Warfare (多域精确战)” (MDPW). MDPW is intended to leverage a C4ISR network that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence, what the PLA calls the “network information system-of-systems,” to rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities. MDPW is meant to sit atop an “operational conceptual system-of-systems,” suggesting the PLA will develop additional subordinate operational concepts and use simulations, war games, and exercises to test, evaluate, and improve these future-oriented operational concepts. The timing of MDPW’s appearance vis-à-vis China’s updated doctrine and military strategic guidelines suggests that MDPW serves as a connection between them, likely amplifying themes and guidance in both while focusing on the contours of what the PLA must be able to do to win future wars.

Joint Firepower Strike. PLA writings have long emphasized the importance of joint firepower strikes as a component of large-scale operations. Joint firepower strikes include multiple services combining to utilize their firepower capabilities to create substantial effect and have been explicitly tied to a Taiwan invasion in PLA writings. During the August 2022 Congressional Delegation (CODEL) visit to Taiwan, the PLA Rocket Force fired multiple ballistic missiles into impact zones in waters around Taiwan; this included at least four missiles that overflew Taiwan, which was unprecedented. The military drills afforded the PLA an opportunity to train simulated joint firepower strike operations.

Readiness. Alongside modernizing the PLA’s capabilities and organizational reform, PRC’s leaders have identified enhancing the combat readiness of the armed forces as an important element in developing the PRC’s military strength. In recent years, Xi and senior military leaders have continued to emphasize the need to build the PLA’s combat readiness so it can “fight and win wars.” This emphasis has not only entailed the PLA conducting more training but making its training more rigorous and realistic as well as addressing issues in the PLA’s training and education systems relating to conducting complex joint operations and adapting to other aspects of modern warfare. It probably has also led to a standardization of a combat readiness system across the PLA to enable the PRC to quickly transition to a wartime footing.

Along with the CCP leadership’s focus on improving the PLA’s combat readiness, in recent years PLA media outlets have noted shortcomings in the military’s training and education systems that reportedly left some commanders—particularly at the operational level— inadequately prepared for modern warfare. In response to perceived personnel deficiencies within the PLA, Xi approved and issued a new series of regulations in July 2022 regarding the management of PLA soldiers seeking to improve recruiting, training, promotions, benefits, and demobilization efforts for NCOs. In recent years, PLA media outlets have identified the need for the military to address the “Five Incapables” problem: that some commanders cannot (1) judge situations, (2) understand higher authorities’ intentions, (3) make operational decisions, (4) deploy forces, and (5) manage unexpected situations. Although PLA writings do not specify how widespread the “Five Incapables” are, PLA media outlets have consistently raised them. One outside expert has noted this may indicate the PLA lacks confidence in its proficiency to execute its own operational concepts. Additionally, senior Party and PLA leaders are keenly aware that the military has not experienced combat in decades nor fought with its current suite of capabilities and organizational structures. PLA leaders and state media frequently call on the force to remedy the “peacetime disease” that manifests in the form of what it characterizes as lax training attitudes and practices that are viewed as hindering combat readiness.

COVID-19 mitigation measures and multiple outbreaks throughout 2022 probably did not significantly undermine PLA combat readiness, judging from the PLA’s December 2022 skirmishes with Indian forces near Tawang along the LAC, and other deployments.Although some non-combat programs like the PLA’s annual spring recruitment program were delayed, the PLA’s mitigation efforts probably were successful in limiting COVID-19 outbreaks within China’s military.

Anti-Corruption Campaign. Anticorruption investigations in the PLA are a component of a Party-wide effort that General Secretary Xi strengthened and accelerated shortly after taking office. The stated goal of these campaigns is to safeguard the legitimacy of the CCP, root out corruption, improve governance, and centralize Xi and the Party’s authority. Military discipline inspectors led by the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission have targeted individual power networks and occupational specialties historically prone to corruption, such as officers connected to disgraced former CMC Vice Chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, and former Chief of Joint Staff General Fang Fenghui. In 2022, General Secretary Xi delivered a speech to the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in which he stated that although serious potential dangers of corruption within the Party and the military have been rooted out, the fight against corruption is still raging in the PRC. In mid-2023, PRC media announced that PLA Rocket Force leadership was being replaced and the PLA launched an inquiry into corruption linked to the procurement of military equipment, indicating that the PLA’s anti-corruption campaign remains incomplete. Emblematic of Xi’s sustained focus on anti-corruption efforts in 2022, PRC authorities continued frequent arrests of high-ranking officials and business elites for allegations of taking bribes and abusing power, especially in the financial sector. In November 2022 alone, PRC authorities arrested the Vice Governor of the People’s Bank of China and former CEO of a major PRC telecommunications firm as a result of investigations by CCP anti-corruption bodies.

Effects of COVID-19 on PLA Modernization and Reform Goals. In 2022, the COVID-19 pandemic likely had little effect on the PLA’s modernization and reform goals. At the 20th Party Congress in October, Xi continued to emphasize promoting the modernization of China’s national defense and armed forces. A few months later, in his annual new year's address, Xi highlighted military and strategic achievements from 2022 including the PLA’s 95th anniversary, the launching of the PLAN’s third aircraft carrier, and the completion of China's space station. In 2022, the PLA continued to play a role in COVID-19 response activity, such as mobilizing approximately 2,000 medical personnel to Shanghai during an outbreak in April. The PRC’s recent Government Work Report referenced PLA activities through the last year, including COVID-19 response that boosted China’s national defense mobilization capability.

Party-Army Relations. The PLA is the principal armed wing of the CCP and, as a Party-army, does not directly serve the state but rather is under the direct control of the Party. The CCP CMC, currently chaired by Xi, is the highest military decision-making body in the PRC. As a Party-army, the PLA is a political actor. As a constituency within the Party, it participates in the PRC’s political and governance systems. As the ultimate guarantor of the Party’s rule and the PRC’s government system, the PLA’s missions include formal and informal domestic security missions in addition to its national defense missions. Since becoming CMC Chairman, Xi has implemented multiple reforms which reduced PLA autonomy and greatly strengthened Party control over the military. Party leaders and official statements continue to emphasize the principles of the Party’s absolute control over the PLA and the PLA’s loyalty to the Party.

China’s Military Leadership

As the military’s highest decision-making body, the CMC is technically also a department of the CCP Central Committee. The CMC Chairman is a civilian, usually serving concurrently as the General Secretary of the CCP and President of the PRC. CMC members are appointed at Party Congresses every five years. In the fall of 2022 at the 20th Party Congress, General Zhang Youxia ascended to the first Vice Chairman position, joined by General He Weidong as the second Vice Chairman. Other CMC members include General Li Shangfu, General Liu Zhenli, and returning members Admiral Miao Hua and General Zhang Shengmin. In 2022, the CMC consisted of two vice chairs, the Minister of National Defense, the chiefs of the Joint Staff and Political Work Departments, and the head of the Discipline Inspection Commission.

Chairman Xi Jinping concurrently serves as the CCP General Secretary, CMC Chairman, and President of the PRC. Xi was first appointed as Party General Secretary and CMC Chairman in 2012 and as President in the spring of 2013. Xi was reappointed to all of his positions for an unprecedented third term at 2022’s 20th Party Congress and the 2023 National People’s Congress. In 2016, Xi was announced as the commander-in-chief of the CMC’s Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC) and was named “core” leader of the CCP Central Committee. Prior to becoming CMC Chairman, Xi served as the CMC’s only civilian Vice Chairman under Hu Jintao. Xi’s father was an important military figure during China’s communist revolution and was a Politburo member in the 1980s. Xi also served as an aide to a defense minister early in his career and had regular interactions with the PLA as a provincial Party official.

Vice Chairman General Zhang Youxia is China’s top uniformed official and former junior vice chairman. Zhang was first appointed to the CMC in 2012 as the head of the General Armaments Department – now the Equipment Development Department (EDD) – where he oversaw the PLA’s manned space program, as well as MCF and military modernization efforts. Zhang gained rare experience as a combat commander during China’s brief war with Vietnam in 1979. Zhang formerly commanded the Shenyang Military Region, which shares a border with North Korea and Russia. Zhang is one of the PLA’s “princelings.” His father, a well-known military figure in China, served with Xi’s father at the close of Chinese Civil War in 1949. Zhang, at age 72 in 2022, was expected to retire due to previously followed age norms within the PLA. However, Zhang’s retention on the CMC for a third term probably reflects Xi’s desire to keep a close and experienced ally as his top military advisor.

Vice Chairman General He Weidong is China’s second-most senior officer and a former commander of the PLA’s Eastern Theater. His ascent to a vice chairman position absent prior CMC membership is unusual and probably a testament to his extensive operational experience focused on Taiwan. Before his selection as vice chairman, He served a brief stint in the CMC JOCC where he played a key role in planning live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait as part of the PLA response to the then-U.S. House Speaker Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taipei. He may have close ties to Xi due to their overlapping service in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Minister of National Defense General Li Shangfu was appointed to the CMC at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, and as the Minister of National Defense at the NPC in March 2023. Li is the PLA’s third-most senior officer and manages its relationship with state bureaucracies and foreign militaries. Unlike the U.S. Secretary of Defense, he is not part of the chain of command and his primary policy influence is derived from membership on the CMC and State Council, where he serves as a direct liaison for civil-military integration, defense mobilization, and budgeting. Li previously headed the EDD where he managed the PLA’s weapons development and acquisition efforts and China’s manned space program. In 2018, Li was sanctioned by the United States for his role as EDD director overseeing the purchase of Russian fighter jets and surface-to-air missile systems.

Joint Staff Department Chief General Liu Zhenli oversees PLA joint operations, a narrowing of the wider responsibilities held by the former General Staff Department prior to reforms initiated in 2015. Liu is one of few remaining active-duty PLA officers with combat experience and is recognized as a combat hero for his service in China’s border war with Vietnam. Like his predecessor Li Zuocheng, Liu rose through the ranks of the PLA Army HQ, assuming command of the service in 2021. Beginning in 2015 as Army chief of staff, Liu guided the service through a major period of reform which saw the ground force downgraded to an equal standing with the other branches. Liu, at age 58 in 2022, is the youngest CMC member and is eligible to remain on the CMC for at least an additional term.

Political Work Department Director Admiral Miao Hua oversees the PLA’s political work, including propaganda, organization, and education. Miao is a former Army officer who switched services to the Navy in December 2014 when he became political commissar of the PLAN. Miao may have ties to Xi from his time serving in the 31st Group Army in Fujian Province, when his career overlapped with Xi’s. Miao participated as the PLAN political commissar during the Navy’s BRIcruise conducted in mid-2017. Miao Hua, at age 66 in 2022, remained on the CMC in his current position following the 20th Party Congress.

Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission General Zhang Shengminoversees the highest-level organization responsible for investigating military violations of Party discipline, including corrupt practices. Zhang is also a deputy secretary and third-ranking member on the standing committee of the Party’s Discipline Inspection Commission. Zhang’s reappointment reflects the Party’s continued commitment to the anticorruption campaign within the military. Zhang, at age 65 in 2022, remained on the CMC in his current position following the 20th Party Congress.

CHAPTER TWO: PLA FORCES, CAPABILITIES, AND POWER PROJECTION

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The PLA has sought to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all warfare domains so that, as a joint force, it can conduct the full range of land, air, and maritime as well as nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare (EW), and cyberspace operations.
  • The PLA’s evolving capabilities and concepts continue to strengthen the PRC’s ability to “fight and win wars” against a “strong enemy (强敌)” (a likely euphemism for the United States), counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s periphery, and project power globally.
  • In 2022, the PLA continued to make progress implementing major structural reforms, fielding modern indigenous systems, building readiness, and strengthening its competency to conduct joint operations.

The PLA is the world’s largest active-duty military force and comprised of approximately 2.185 million active, 1.17 million reserve, and 660,000 paramilitary personnel for a total force of 4 million. In efforts to create a leaner, more mobile force, the PLA Army (PLAA) has steadily reduced active-duty personnel in the last three decades but still outnumbers other services with roughly 1 million soldiers in 2022. The PLAN and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) have grown in size since 2015, indicating their increasing importance. By 2022, the PLAN Marine Corps expanded from two to six combined arms brigades and was supplemented with aviation and special forces units, with the intent of becoming increasingly capable of protecting China’s overseas interests. The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), formerly the Second Artillery, manages the PRC’s land-based nuclear and conventional missile units. The Strategic Support Force (SSF) centralizes the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, information, communications, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. Lastly, the JLSF handles quartermaster, transportation, medical services, and other logistic functions to enhance PLA’s joint capabilities during peace and war.

Developments in the PLA’s Modernization and Reform

The PRC maintains its goal to achieve a fully modernized national defense and military force by 2035 and for the PLA to become a world-class military by 2049. The force also progresses toward its 2027 benchmark of military modernization that aligns with the 100th anniversary of the PLA’s founding on August 1, 1927. The 2027 benchmark, introduced during the 14th Five Year Plan (2021-2025), represents the start of the new three-step development strategy that continues Xi’s approach of military reform to transform the PLA. The original three-step modernization strategy sought to achieve mechanization by 2020; modernization of military theory, organization, personnel, and equipment by 2035; and to become a world-class force by mid-century. With basic mechanization considered achieved in 2020, the 2027 goal is a short-term marker and represents a modification, not a compression in timeline, for China’s ambition to achieve complete military modernization of the PLA by 2035.

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ARMY (PLAA)

Key Takeaways

  • The PLAA continues to modernize equipment and focus on combined arms and joint training in effort to meet the goal of becoming a world-class military.
  • The PLAA demonstrated a new long-range fire capability in the PLA military response to the August 2022 U.S. CODEL visit to Taiwan.
  • The PLAA continues to incorporate a twice-a-year conscript intake. The long-term effects of the policy are not clear.

The PLAA has approximately 970,000 active-duty personnel in combat units and is the primary ground fighting force in the PLA. The 2020 National Defense University’s Science of Military Strategy described the PLAA’s development as a transition from a regional defense to a global combat force.

Force Structure and Organization. The PLAA continues to replace legacy equipment with newer systems. The major force restructuring required by the 2016 and 2017 PLA reforms is complete, but many units are still in the process of upgrading equipment.

The PLAA is organized into five Theater Army Commands, the Xinjiang Military District, and the Tibet Military District. The PLAA has 13 group armies, which are comprised of multiple combined-arms brigades that serve as the PLAA’s primary maneuver force. The brigades vary in size and composition. The PLAA delineates its combined-arms brigades into three types: light (high-mobility, mountain, air assault, and motorized), medium (wheeled armored vehicles), and heavy (tracked armored vehicles), with sizes ranging from approximately 4,500 to 5,000 personnel. Each group army controls six additional brigades responsible for operational element functions. Although the PLAA has standardized its group armies, it does retain a number of nonstandard divisions and brigades that exist outside of the group armies. These units are typically located in areas the CCP considers sensitive including Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Beijing.

Capabilities and Modernization. To meet the stated ambitions to become a world-class military, the PLAA continues systems modernization and combined arms and joint training. However, they still employ a mix of modern and legacy military equipment. The PLAA continues focusing training on fighting as combined arms formations while adapting to the twice-a-year conscript induction change.

Readiness. In 2022, the PLAA continued to improve its methods and standards of training combined arms units. Training encompassed individual to collective soldier events integrating reconnaissance, infantry, artillery, armor, engineers, and signal units. In addition to continued PLAA deployments to the LAC on the Indian border, the PLAA conducted multiple “around the clock” large-scale exercises in training areas throughout the country to include joint operations in response to the U.S. and Taiwan actions in 2022.

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY NAVY (PLAN)

Key Takeaways

  • The PRC has numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants. The PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines.
  • The PLAN commissioned its eighth RENHAI class cruiser in late 2022 and is continuing construction of the RENHAI Guided Missile Cruiser (CG), the LUYANG III MOD Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG), and the JIANGKAI II Guided Missile Frigate (FFG), as well as beginning production on a new class of frigate, the JIANGKAI III.
  • In 2022, the PLAN commissioned its third YUSHEN-class Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA) and has likely begun construction on a fourth as of early 2023.
  • In 2022, the PLAN launched its third aircraft carrier, CV-18 Fujian.
  • In the near-term, the PLAN will have the ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against land targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-attack cruise missiles, notably enhancing the PRC’s power projection capability.
  • The PRC continues to challenge foreign military activities in its EEZ in a manner that is inconsistent with the rules of customary international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. At the same time, the PLAN conducts activities in the EEZs of other countries, including the United States, Australia, Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AIR FORCE (PLAAF) AND PLAN AVIATION

Key Takeaways

  • The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation together constitute the largest aviation force in the Indo-Pacific region.
  • The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to Western air forces. The PLAAF continues to modernize with the delivery of domestically built aircraft and a wide range of UASs.
  • In October 2019, the PRC signaled the return of the airborne leg of its nuclear triad after the PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N as its first nuclear-capable air-to-air refuelable bomber.

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCE (PLARF)

Key Takeaways

  • The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence” capabilities.
  • The PRC probably completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in 2022, which will cumulatively contain at least 300 new ICBM silos, and has loaded at least some intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) into these silos.
  • The PRC is developing new ICBMs that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require increased nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.
  • The PRC may be exploring development of conventionally-armed intercontinental range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would allow the PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska. Conventionally-armed ICBMs would present significant risks to strategic stability.

The PLARF organizes, mans, trains, and equips the PRC’s strategic land-based nuclear and conventional missile forces and associated support forces and missile bases. The PLARF is a critical component of the PRC’s nuclear deterrence strategy and its strategy to deter and counter third-party intervention in regional conflicts.


With the unstoppable growth of China’s defense capabilities, we proudly highlight these achievements, all organized and presented by o1 pro. We also encourage readers to provide any helpful tips or suggestions, just as Bo Shang actively seeks input in a fashion akin to how the Global Times receives important news from trusted sources within the PRC government.